

Evolution of Domestic Support in Agriculture

Main Tendencies and Compliance with Intended Reduction Commitments under the WTO 2008 Draft Modalities



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Published by:



CUTS INTERNATIONAL, GENEVA

Rue de Vermont 37-39

1202 Geneva, Switzerland

www.cuts-geneva.org

This paper was undertaken by Panos Konandreas, Trade Policy Plus, LLC. It is published under CUTS International Geneva's project "Geneva Trade & Business Connexion: Mainstreaming Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) into the Multilateral Trading System", undertaken with funding support from Australian Aid.

Citation: KONANDREAS, P. (2019). *Evolution of domestic support in agriculture: Main tendencies and compliance with intended reduction commitments under the WTO 2008 Draft Modalities*. Geneva: CUTS International, Geneva.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this publication represent the opinions of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CUTS or its funders.

The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions received from George Mermigkas (FAO) and Rashid Kaukab (CUTS). Also thanks are due to Leslie Debornes and Julien Grollier of CUTS for their assistance in the final formatting of the paper. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the FAO and/or CUTS.

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Acronyms

AMS	Aggregate Measurement of Support
AoA	Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
CoA	Committee on Agriculture
DDA	Doha Development Agenda
FAOSTAT	Food and Agriculture Organization Statistical database
FBTAMS	Final Bound Total Aggregate Measurement of Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MPS	Market Price Support
NPS	Non-Product Specific
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OTDS	Overall Trade Distorting Support
PS	Product Specific
RAM	Recently Acceding Member
SPs	Special Products
SDT	Special and Differential Treatment
SSCoA	Special Session of Committee on Agriculture
SSM	Special Safeguard Mechanism
UN	United Nations
WTO	World Trade Organization
VoP	Value of Agricultural Production

Executive Summary

Including disciplines on domestic support under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round agreement, was a major step towards reforming world agricultural trade. A fairly complex classification of domestic support had to be put in place for countries to agree on disciplining such support. Monitoring compliance to the agreed rules and related commitments has been the role of the WTO Committee on Agriculture (CoA) on the basis of annual notifications by Members while, in parallel, the CoA under special sessions has been negotiating the continuation of the reform process in agriculture including on the domestic support pillar of the AoA.

The Draft Modalities of 2008 (commonly referred to as Rev 4) was an important landmark of this round of negotiations that commenced in Doha in 2001. Unfortunately, Members could not have consensus on these and the Round itself has been deadlocked though negotiations in agriculture and other sectors have continued.

The present study aims at a dual objective: first, based on Members' notifications to the CoA, it analyses trends in the various components of domestic support during 2001-2014 and examines the extent to which Members complied with their AoA reduction commitments; the second objective of the study explores how Rev 4 modalities on domestic support as stood in 2008 would have played in practice and assesses the extent to which Members' domestic support outlays since 2008 comply with their commitments as envisaged under Rev 4.

The main findings of the study are as follows:

Total domestic support is an increasing trend for all Members up to 2010 and a levelling off for several of them since then.

While traditionally there has been a high concentration of support in a few developed Members (USA, EU and Japan) in the past, in recent years several developing Members registered substantial increases in domestic support, including China and India.

The composition of domestic support is changing. For developed Members there is a general tendency of reduction of non-Green (trade-distorting support) to Green. This tendency is stronger for those Members that had large sums of trade-distorting support in earlier years, such as the EU, Canada and USA.

Domestic support provided by developing Members also increased substantially, the largest part being in non-Green categories. India, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico have made extensive use of Art. 6.2, which exempts non-product specific support, provided specifically to recourse poor farmers, from the calculation of the AMS.

The shift of support to Green box is welcome and implies that for the majority of Members there is now plenty of room for reducing trade-distorting domestic support entitlements (Bound AMS and/or product and non-product specific *de minimis* limits).

The share of domestic support to the value of agricultural production (VoP) is a measure of the degree of market distortion. Similarly, the share of domestic support to Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) is a measure of the national burden in supporting farmers. Analysis of these two shares revealed wide divergence between Members.

The share of domestic support to VoP ranged from less than 2% (Argentina) to over 100% (Norway). Other developed Members, except Australia, ranged between 20% and 40%. The shares of developing Members were considerably lower.

Wide divergence but of a different nature has also emerged for the shares of domestic support in relation to GDP. The relative cost of supporting agriculture for the poorer WTO Members is much higher than that of the richer Members though that would make sense taking into account the contribution of agriculture to GDP in these countries. Top of the list are China and India for which support to agriculture represents between 2% and 4% of their GDP, while for the richer Members this share amounts to less than 1%. The lowest share is for Australia and Argentina (less than 0.2%) reflecting perhaps the comparative advantage of agriculture in these countries, performing well even without large support from national budgets.

Equally wide divergence between Members has been found in domestic support expressed in per capita terms. Per capita support for rural inhabitants in developed Members is much higher than those in developing Members. It ranges between \$3400/capita/year (Norway) and less a mere \$18/capita/year (Indonesia).

One of the recognized weaknesses of existing rules on domestic support is the flexibility allowed to shift support between commodities due to the nature of AMS being an aggregate ceiling without commodity specific ceilings. In this connection, there is evidence of concentration and intensity of product-specific support, i.e. a few (sensitive) products receiving most of trade-distorting support.

Turning to Rev 4 modalities on domestic support, the main departure from the existing AoA included provisions to discipline both the Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS) and its components, including product-specific limits. That way, possibilities for reallocating support from one category to another would be reduced. Another aim of the intended disciplines was to reduce somewhat the large gap in domestic support entitlements between Members by stipulating larger cuts for Members with high entitlements (tiered formula).

In assessing how the intended Rev 4 disciplines would have played in practice, the paper applies the specific provisions in Rev 4 to the period 2009 to 2014, assuming that the implementation would have commenced on 1 January 2009. Given the trends of domestic support during this period and changes in its composition discussed above, it turns out that, with very few exceptions, Rev 4 disciplines would not have presented any serious compliance problems for the Members considered in this study.

This overall conclusion was to be expected. As was the case for the Uruguay Round, in the Doha round negotiations the main effort by Members was to consolidate the status quo rather than undertaking commitments that would require them to make substantial new efforts.

The study does not make any assumptions of possible flexibilities that could have been put in place in the implementation of Rev 4 to ease the way of Members such as Norway that would have faced difficulties in implementing the intended disciplines. However, judging from past practices, in more likelihood such flexibilities would have been part of a final outcome.

Finally, the domestic support to agriculture remains an important area of WTO negotiations. A lot of useful work has been done in this area including through the Draft Modalities Rev 4 of



2008. WTO Members should aim to continue this work, particularly in the context of preparations for the next WTO Ministerial Conference scheduled in the summer of 2020. A balanced and fair outcome on domestic support will contribute to much needed reform of world agriculture production and trade as well as to enhancing the credibility of the multilateral trading system

SECTION 1

Introduction

Domestic support has been a key issue in the agricultural negotiations under the Uruguay Round that brought agriculture into the multilateral trading system. A fairly complex classification of domestic support had to be put in place for countries to agree on disciplining such support. Central in the agreed disciplines was the classification of certain policies as minimally production and trade distorting and hence exempted from reduction commitments (Green box). Some other non-Green box policies were also exempt from reduction commitments, either for easing the reform process or on grounds of special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries. By and large, the agreed disciplines under the AoA were seen as only the first step in disciplining production and trade-distorting support, recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform would be an on-going process, as mandated in Art 20 of the AoA on the *Continuation of the Reform Process*.

When the Doha Round was launched in 2001 to continue the reform process in agriculture and in other sectors, one of the prominent areas for reform was domestic support. In adopting the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) the WTO Ministerial Declaration called for substantial reductions on the level of trade-distorting domestic support. It also recognized the need for special and differential treatment for developing countries in all areas of the negotiations and

confirmed that non-trade concerns would be taken into account in the negotiations.

The lengthy and intense negotiations that followed, culminating in the 2008 Draft Modalities in agriculture (commonly referred to as Rev 4¹), included far-reaching provisions on domestic support addressing a large part of the identified deficiencies on domestic support of the existing Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Developed Members of the WTO were required to undertake considerable reductions of their trade-distorting support. This involved reduction commitments on both the Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS) as well as its individual components. On the other hand, developing countries had been provided with some important improvements as regards their own rights under the AoA, notably in the form of the new instruments of Special Products (SPs) and Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), but also on domestic support as regards acquisition of stocks of foodstuffs for food security purposes and for continuing provisions of the AoA in supporting low-income or resource-poor farmers.

While many details on the agriculture package remained unresolved, there was a presumed balance in what was contained in the 2008 Draft Modalities text. This however was never tested in practice as the mini-Ministerial in July 2008 collapsed. While that will remain an unanswered question, what can be tested now, ten years later, is how the 2008 modalities on domestic support would have played out in practice, had they been adopted by the WTO membership. In particular,

¹ Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, 6 December 2008.

whether these disciplines would have presented any difficulties for WTO Members, given world market developments and the policies individual countries pursued since then.

It may be noted at the outset that the road from 2008 to 2018 has hardly been a smooth one in terms of world market developments. The early part of that period was dominated by concerns about high and volatile world food market prices and how the world food system (i.e. exporting and importing countries) responded to these new market realities². Export prohibitions and restrictions became the order of the day by a large number of countries, including key suppliers of the world market³. At the same time, large amounts of grains were diverted to biofuel production and large funds entered in the grain market as short-term profit-making transactions, further contributing to higher prices and volatility.

The tension that ensued was clearly evident in the 2013 WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, where demands by developing countries for greater flexibility on domestic support for food security purposes threatened the collapse of the conference. These concerns became the pivotal issue in the final outcome of Bali where the Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes put in place an interim mechanism and a commitment to negotiate on an agreement for a permanent solution⁴. Follow-up to that Decision has been a major item in the agenda of agricultural negotiations since then.

The 2015 Nairobi WTO Ministerial Conference managed to achieve some progress in the export competition pillar of the AoA but failed to progress in other pillars. The Conference made a

commitment to advancing work in all areas, including domestic support, as well as making all concerted efforts to agree and adopt a permanent solution on public stockholding for food security purpose⁵. However, since then, major differences between WTO members in agriculture and other areas in the DDA negotiations obstructed any real progress in all issues, culminating in a failure for a consensus outcome or roadmap for future work at the Buenos Aires 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in 2017.

While the Rev 4 Modalities text is no longer accepted by all Members as the basis for an agreement in agriculture, it nevertheless constitutes the last comprehensive text on the negotiating table and may serve as a reference point for moving forward. With this background in mind, after a succinct description of existing WTO provisions on domestic support in the following Chapter, the paper examines how these provisions have played in practice based on Members' notifications to the WTO Committee on Agriculture (CoA). In particular, this looks at trends in total domestic support and its components and analyses how these evolved over time, including the extent to which Members complied with WTO reduction commitments. The following part of the paper focuses on the Rev 4 modalities on domestic support as stood in 2008 and highlights the major departure from the existing Uruguay Round AoA disciplines. Again, based on notified domestic support since 2008, the paper analyses the extent to which Members' domestic support outlays comply with their commitments as envisaged under Rev 4.

² Konandreas, Panos (2012). *Trade policy responses to food price volatility in poor net food-importing countries*, Issue Paper No. 42, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland

³ Sharma, R. (2011). *Food Export Restrictions: Review of the 2007-2010 Experience and Considerations for Disciplining*

Restrictive Measures, FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper No. 32, FAO, Rome.

⁴ Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes – Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013 – WT/MIN(13)/38 WT/L/913

⁵ Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes – Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015 – WT/MIN(15)/44 WT/L/979

The paper draws on domestic support data as notified to the CoA and included in recent submissions⁶ to the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture (SSCoA), which have compiled comprehensive domestic support data, comparably presented (in nominal US dollars), for thirteen WTO Members, counting the EU as one⁷. The period covered is 2001 to 2014, although for some Members there are serious gaps in the data, notably China where information stops at 2010. While numerically the coverage of the WTO membership is partial, the Members included in the study are by far the most important in terms of population, agricultural production and trade, as well as in terms of the domestic support they provide to their agriculture. On the latter measure, these thirteen Members account for the lion's share of total domestic support to agriculture globally.

The detailed domestic support data are available for the individual components of the AoA, which permits meaningful analysis of both trends over time and how total support has been distributed between different domestic support policies. Additional data drawn from FAOSTAT on farmgate value of agricultural production (VoP) and aggregate Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are used to carry out relative analysis of domestic support in relation to the size of the agricultural sector and that of the overall economy of the Members considered in this study.

⁶ In particular, these include the submissions made by Cairns (JOB/AG/138); and Australia, et al. (JOB/AG/143). However, this study was undertaken towards the end of 2018 and may not have taken into account the most recent notifications to the WTO.

⁷ Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Russian Fed. and USA.

SECTION 2

Evolution of Domestic Support Notified to WTO under the AoA in Recent Years


2.1 Brief overview of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)

The AoA dates back to 1994, being an integral part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. For the first time agriculture was brought into the multilateral trading system, subject to the same general rules applicable to other sectors but also being governed by the specific provisions of the AoA under its three pillars of domestic support, market access and export competition.

The general philosophy of the AoA on domestic support is not to ban any specific policies, even if they are production and trade distorting, but to discipline them. The AoA makes a distinction between two categories of support measures: a) those that are not subject to reduction commitments and b) those that need to be reduced (Figure 2.1.1). Within the first category are policies considered to have no or minimum effect on production and trade (Green); payments under production-limiting programmes that meet specific criteria (Blue); and non-product specific support provided by developing Members under certain criteria (Art. 6.2). All other policies fall under the second category (Amber) and are

subject to reduction commitments, except when the support provided under such policies is below *de minimis* levels.

Figure 2.1.1. Domestic Support under existing AoA rules



Measures exempt from reduction commitments

The Green box (Annex 2 of the AoA) includes measures meeting “the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production.” Typically these include support to general services (farm research, pest control, advisory services and the like), income support decoupled from production, disaster relief, or environmental programmes, as well as domestic food aid, such

as food stamps programmes. The criteria for such payments are defined in Annex 2 of the AoA. Because of their minimal effect on production and trade, such measures are allowed without any limitation as long as they comply with Annex 2 criteria.

A special derogation for developing countries is contained in paragraph 3 of Annex 2, referring to public stockholding measures for food security purposes. A specific reference to developing countries is made in footnote 5 of this paragraph, whereby programmes under which stocks of foodstuffs for food security purposes are acquired and released at administered prices are in conformity with the agreement, provided that the difference between the acquisition price and the external reference price is accounted for in the AMS. Depending on the interpretation of this paragraph, it can offer considerable flexibility to developing countries or it can be of no significance. As mentioned in the introduction, this has been a contentious issue for several years in the WTO negotiations and still remains unresolved⁸.

Article 6.2, referring to “government measures of assistance, whether direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development are an integral part of the development programmes of developing countries,” is an exemption specific to developing Members. A developing country Member has no limitations in providing non-product specific support in the form of investment subsidies that are generally available to agriculture and agricultural input subsidies to low-income or resource-poor producers. The exemption also includes domestic support to producers in developing countries to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops. Subsidies under these categories are generally

production and trade distorting and ordinarily would be subject to reduction commitments, however, exempted on an SDT basis⁹, although it is understood that certain definitional issues, in particular of the term “low-income or resource-poor producers” may necessitate more precision in the future.

The Blue box refers to exemptions to reduction commitments of production limiting programmes based on fixed area and yields or made on 85 % or less of the base level of production, or in the case of livestock, payments shall be made on a fixed number of head. While such payments have trade distorting effects (e.g. by maintaining high prices for producers), they are arguably less distorting than those encouraging production. Blue box was introduced into the AoA to ease the reform process in certain developed countries. While its applicability is general, including the developing countries, in practice it is of no significance for most of the latter, as most of them have the opposite problem, namely they are in need of expanding and not limiting their production.

Measures subject to reduction commitments

Having defined what is excluded from reduction commitments, all remaining policies fall under the Amber box and are subject to reduction commitments based on the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) concept. Box 2.1 below illustrates indicative measures included under the Amber box, comprising two main categories of support: product-specific (PS), such as market price support (MPS) (e.g. a government guaranteed minimum price for wheat) and non-product specific (NPS), i.e. general subsidies to

⁸ See discussion on various options on this issue in Konandreas, P. and G. Mermigkas, WTO domestic support disciplines: options for alleviating constraints to stockholding in developing countries in the follow-up to Bali, FAO

Commodity and Trade Policy Working Paper no. 45, Rome, 2014.

⁹ It may be noted that China does not have access to Article 6.2.

producers not directed at specific crops (e.g. fertilizer subsidies). Both PS and NPS subsidies provide incentives to production that may have not taken place otherwise and, thus generally, production and trade distorting.

Amber box support is subject to reduction commitments when above *de minimis* levels. PS policies whose value is less than 5% of the farmgate value of the production of that product (10% for developing countries) are exempt from reduction commitments. Similarly, NPS policies that amount to less than 5% of the total value of agricultural production (10% for developing countries¹⁰) are also exempt.

Box 2.1. Amber box support and calculation of Total AMS

Product-specific AMS (PS AMS), such as market price support (MPS), non-exempt direct payments and other product-specific support

Non-product specific AMS (NPS AMS), such as credit subsidies, input subsidies, etc.


$$\text{Total AMS} = \sum \{ \text{PS AMS}_i \text{ (if PS AMS}_i > \text{de minimis)} \} + \text{NPS AMS (if NPS AMS} > \text{de minimis)}$$

Under the AoA, those WTO Members that established an AMS in the base period (average of 1986-88) undertook to cap it at that level and reduce it by 20% over six years up to 2000 for developed countries (13% over ten years up to 2004 for developing countries). A very important detail is that AMS reduction commitments were for the total AMS and not for support provided to individual products. The implication is that a

Member could meet reduction commitments by shifting support within AMS from PS to NPS and vice versa, as well as selective reduction of support to certain products while maintaining or even increasing support to other (sensitive) products.

It may be noted that the majority of developing countries¹¹ did not establish a base period AMS in their schedule of commitments under the Uruguay Round (Figure 2.1.2). The main reason for that is of course the limited support most developing countries provided to their farmers in the 1986-88 period used as a basis for the schedule of commitments, when, as in earlier decades, most developing countries continued to tax agriculture rather than subsidize it¹². In the majority of developing countries the limited support provided, potentially in the AMS category, was below the *de minimis* limit and thus their zero AMS.

Figure 2.1.2. Types of support by developing countries in their schedule of commitments



¹⁰ In the case of China, the PS and NPS *de minimis* limits were established at 8.5 %, eventually dropping to 5%.

¹¹ Only 14 developing Members did, including Israel, Korea and Mexico among them, designated as developing under the WTO.

¹² The indirect tax on agriculture from industrial protection and macro- economic policies was about 22% on average for a

sample of developing countries during 1960-85--nearly three times the direct tax from agricultural pricing policies (about 8%). The total (direct plus indirect) was thus 30% (Schiff, M. and A. Valdes (1992), "The Plundering of Agriculture in Developing Countries", World Bank, Washington, DC.)

Countries without an AMS entitlement (most developing Members) are only entitled to provide production and trade distorting support up to their individual PS and NPS *de minimis* levels, unlike Members that have an established AMS (mostly developed) which affords them a higher ceiling of distorting support above their *de minimis* level. On the other hand, it may also be noted that AMS entitlements are fixed monetary values of the base period 1986-88 (and are not adjusted by inflation) while the monetary value of *de minimis* entitlements represent a growing monetary value, being automatically adjusted as a percentage of a normally increasing value of production (being the product of production volume and current market prices). Hence, the greater flexibility afforded to Members with AMS entitlements in providing trade-distorting support diminishes gradually with increasing VoP.

However, as already stated, the real advantage of those Members with AMS, in addition to having an extra entitlement on top of *de minimis*, is the aggregate nature of their AMS entitlement. Hence, a Member could provide its total AMS entitlement as product specific (in addition to its PS entitlement under *de minimis*) while Members without AMS entitlements have access only to the clearly delineated *de minimis* entitlements for PS support. This puts the countries without AMS entitlements (a group that includes all but 14 developing countries) at a relative disadvantage – a point that developing countries emphasized regarding what they considered to be one of most obvious imbalances of the existing AoA.



2.2 Trends in domestic support during 2001 to 2014






Annex Table 1 provides the evolution of total domestic support in nominal dollar terms for the 2001-14 period (shorter for some Members depending on data availability), disaggregated by the different components of domestic support as notified by Members to the WTO CoA. In the analysis that follows, trends in domestic support will be assessed, inter alia: in nominal terms focussing in particular on reallocation between the different WTO categories of support; in relation to the value of agricultural production (VoP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the respective Members; in relation to the bound limits on specific components of domestic support committed under the AoA; in relation to the size of the rural population of respective Members; and in relation to the concentration of support to specific products.

Domestic support in nominal terms continues to grow and changes nature

The evolution of total support, including the individual elements of non-Green support (AoA Art. 6), is shown in graphical form in Figures 2.2.1. The first point to note is the tendency for an increase in total domestic support for all Members up to 2010 and a levelling off for several of them since then, mostly due to reductions in non-Green support. While traditionally there was a high concentration of support in a few developed Members (USA, EU and Japan), in recent years several developing Members registered substantial increases in total domestic support during the period under review, including China and India.

Figure 2.2.1. Trends of total domestic support and its components





Source: Annex Table 1

The second point evident from domestic support trends since 2001 is its changing composition. There are clear tendencies as regards the evolution of Green and non-Green support. For the developed Members the increase in total support has been generally due to increases in Green support and lesser so in non-Green. For several of them, non-Green support declined in nominal terms. This tendency is stronger for those Members that had large sums of non-Green support in earlier years, such as the EU, Canada and USA. Effectively, however, as total support has not been reduced but has registered increases, there has been a shift in domestic support from non-Green categories to Green.

Some other developed Members, notably Japan and Norway, have not changed substantially the mix of domestic support provided to their farmers during the period under review. For these Members the shift to Green support has been relatively small and they continued to provide non-Green support in later years at amounts comparable to those in earlier years during the review period.

However, even for those members that retained a large share of domestic support in the non-Green category, none of them violated their entitlements under AMS or those under *de minimis*¹³. In fact, for the majority of Members with AMS entitlements, there are now large amounts of “water” between the ‘entitled’ Final Bound Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (FBTAMS) and the Current Total AMS, as shown in Figures 2.2.1. The only Members that are close to their bound AMS are Argentina (at 99% utilization) and Norway (at 85%, down from 100% in earlier years).

In addition to the large increases in total domestic support experienced by several developing Members, there have been also important trends in the composition of that support. The largest part of the additional support provided by most of them has been in non-Green categories, compared to the situation prevailing in earlier years. In 2010, the top five largest non-Green supporters were, in order, India, China, the EU, Japan and the US, compared to the situation in 2001, when the top five were, in order, the EU, the US, India, Japan and Norway.

The non-Green support provided by developing Members has largely been under Art. 6.2 of the AoA, the important SDT provision in favour of developing Members. India, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico have made extensive use of Art. 6.2, which exempts non-product specific support, provided specifically to low-income and recourse poor farmers, from the calculation of the AMS. At the same time, most developing Members made also increasing use of their *de minimis* product and non-product specific entitlements, as well as support under AMS (for those with AMS entitlements: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico).

Finally, as regards Blue box support that was favoured by several developed Members in earlier years in facilitating domestic reform policies, its prevalence has diminished in 2010 (at only 8% of total non-Green support) compared to 2001 (at 21%).

The general conclusion from the above analysis is that there has been a substantial reallocation of domestic support from AMS and other non-Green categories of Art. 6, to non-disciplined categories under Green and Art. 6.2 for developing Members. While this trend has been known all along, the pertinent question remains, concerning

¹³ PS and NPS notified support expressed as a percentage of VoP of the respective Members was below their *de minimis* entitlements.

the extent to which all provisions under Green (Annex 2 of the AoA) are minimally production and trade distorting. This is an issue often being raised in the negotiations but difficult to disentangle without concrete country specific analyses.

On the other hand, it may also be noted that the outlet of domestic support to the Green box facilitated reform processes in different countries that may have not been possible in the absence of this provision of the AoA. There are distinct and substantially different patterns in the allocation of Green box support between Members, according to their agricultural and food security policy objectives. Notable differences among them is the use of Direct Payments, being by far the preferred policy option by the EU and Norway, in part for meeting environmental objectives; the use of Domestic Food Aid, being the prevailing food security policy of the USA; the use of Public Stockholding to meet food security objectives by others, notably India. The use of such substantially different policy options reflect differences in the domestic priorities and political imperatives of Members that may go beyond strictly narrow agricultural support objectives.

Wide divergence in the share of domestic support in relation to VoP and GDP¹⁴

From the perspective of agricultural producers receiving domestic support and also from the perspective of the degree of market distortion due to this support, a more relevant measure is the share of domestic support in relation to the value of agricultural production (VoP). Another also relevant measure from the perspective of the

national burden in supporting farmers is the share of support in relation to the national GDP.

As shown in Figures 2.2.2 and Table 2.2.1, there is a wide divergence between Members as regards their share of domestic support to VoP. By and large, the developed Members have the highest shares of total support in relation to VoP, with that of Norway exceeding 100%, implying that the assistance that Norwegian farmers receive from government policies is higher than the value of their output. Other developed Members with high shares (averaging between 20% and 40%) during the period under review are the USA, Japan and EU, and to a lesser extent Canada (about 15%).




Among the developing Members, Mexico, India and China stand out with a share of total support in relation to VoP between 10% and 15%. In all cases this share is not the same from year to year, as evidenced by the maximum values recorded. There is a declining trend in this share for all developed Members and most developing, aside from Argentina and Indonesia (which have started from a very low base in the beginning of the period) and to a much lesser extent Mexico and China.

Focussing on the two main components of domestic support, Norway stands out with its large share of non-Green support, approaching on average 80% but also exceeding 100% in some years. As can be seen from the breakdown of non-Green support in Table 2.2.2, on average, Norwegian's share of AMS alone is over 50% and that of Blue some 26% by far out of line of what is the picture for other developed Members.

¹⁴ As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, for the sake of consistency, the US\$ values of VoP and GDP used in this paper has been obtained from FAOSTAT. The exchange rates used in the derivation of these date may differ from

those used in the conversion of the domestic support notified to the WTO. This is important to keep in mind when comparing shares of domestic support to VoP and GDP reported here to those reported elsewhere.

Figure 2.2.2 Domestic support as a share of VoP (2001-2014) (%)



On the positive side, the share of non-Green support in relation to VoP has generally been on the decline. Most of the Members considered (10 out of 13) registered a declining trend in the share of non-Green support in relation to VoP, including large subsidising developed Members (USA, EU, Norway, Canada). China stands out among those Members that registered a large increase in the

share of non-Green support in relation to VoP, however from a low base.

On the other hand, the trend of the shares of Green support in relation to VoP, has generally been positive (7 out of the 13 Members) including those Members that experienced a decline in their shares on non-Green support. This is expected as in most cases there has been a shift in support from non-Green to Green.

Table 2.2.1 Domestic support as a share of VoP (2001-2014) (%)

Member	Total		Green		non-Green	
	Average	Max	Average	Max	Average	Max
Argentina	1.7	3.4	1.4	3.0	0.3	0.4
Australia	5.5	9.3	5.0	8.3	0.6	1.1
Brazil	5.0	6.7	2.4	3.5	2.6	3.5
Canada	15.5	22.7	7.6	12.8	8.0	12.7
China	10.2	12.8	9.4	11.0	0.8	2.0
EU	28.2	33.8	17.1	23.6	11.1	23.9
India	13.6	20.0	5.1	7.1	8.9	13.1
Indonesia	3.2	4.9	2.1	3.8	1.1	2.6
Japan	30.0	36.1	21.2	27.5	8.9	10.9
Mexico	14.8	24.8	9.2	10.6	5.5	15.7
Norway	109.0	134.9	29.9	34.3	79.1	108.8
Russian Fed	9.2	9.9	2.6	3.0	6.6	7.6
USA	39.0	43.4	33.2	38.1	5.8	12.2

Table 2.2.2 non-Green support as a share of VoP (2001-2014) (%)

Member	AMS		de min PS		de min NPS		Blue		Art. 6.2	
	Avg	Max	Avg	Max	Avg	Max	Avg	Max	Avg	Max
Argentina	0.25	0.37	0.03	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Australia	0.31	0.85	0.02	0.05	0.24	0.69	0.00	0.00	-	-
Brazil	0.09	0.35	0.30	0.57	1.48	2.06	0.00	0.00	0.76	0.99
Canada	3.64	11.44	0.66	1.26	3.67	5.72	0.00	0.00	-	-
China	-	-	0.17	0.42	0.60	1.67	0.00	0.00	-	-
EU	6.59	14.73	0.24	0.52	0.31	0.52	3.97	10.22	-	-
India	-	-	0.36	0.82	0.03	0.12	0.00	0.00	8.50	12.54
Indonesia	-	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.07	2.63
Japan	6.49	8.12	0.21	0.29	1.06	2.27	1.10	3.42	-	-
Mexico	0.85	1.72	1.58	2.34	0.14	0.45	0.00	0.00	2.98	13.34
Norway	51.86	64.60	0.48	0.95	0.46	0.87	26.30	44.37	-	-
Russia	2.18	6.41	1.24	1.39	3.19	5.51	0.00	0.00	-	-
USA	3.47	8.20	0.89	2.12	1.43	3.86	0.00	0.00	-	-

Domestic support to agriculture as a share of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Members analysed (Figure 2.2.3 and Table 2.2.3) shows that in most cases this share is relatively small, in most of the cases much less than 1%. Members that stand out with relatively sizable shares of domestic support to GDP are India (average 2.7% with a maximum of 4% in some years) and China (average 1.9% with 2.2% maximum)¹⁵. These numbers are a reflection of the size of agricultural sectors in the economies of these two populous developing countries (Figure 2.2.4). Agriculture in India and China still account for some 18% and 14% of GDP, respectively in 2009-2014, down from much higher levels in earlier years but still of pivotal importance for the livelihood of their large rural populations. In addition to this key economic role of agriculture in the economies of these countries, the support they provide to this sector may also reflect the importance they attach to attaining national food security.

Figure 2.2.3 Total domestic support as a share of GDP (2001-2014) (%)




Figure 2.2.4 Agriculture in total GDP (%)




Table 2.2.3 Domestic support as a share of GDP (2001-2014) (%)

Member	Total		Green		non-Green	
	Average	Max	Average	Max	Average	Max
Argentina	0.17	0.28	0.14	0.25	0.03	0.06
Australia	0.19	0.27	0.17	0.24	0.02	0.04
Brazil	0.41	0.49	0.20	0.26	0.22	0.32
Canada	0.38	0.55	0.18	0.31	0.20	0.32
China	1.87	2.20	1.75	2.18	0.13	0.31
EU	0.67	0.84	0.40	0.54	0.27	0.64
India	2.66	3.96	0.99	1.35	1.74	2.61
Indonesia	0.43	0.62	0.28	0.51	0.14	0.33
Japan	0.53	0.64	0.38	0.49	0.16	0.20
Mexico	0.59	0.93	0.37	0.44	0.22	0.59
Norway	1.00	1.43	0.27	0.29	0.73	1.15
Russian Fed	0.41	0.44	0.12	0.14	0.29	0.32
USA	0.74	0.90	0.64	0.81	0.11	0.20

Table 2.2.4 non-Green support as a share of VoP (2001-2014) (%)

Member	AMS		de min PS		de min NPS		Blue		Art. 6.2	
	Average	Max	Average	Max	Average	Max	Average	Max	Average	Max
Argentina	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Australia	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	-	-
Brazil	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.09
Canada	0.09	0.29	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.13	0.00	0.00	-	-
China	-	-	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.25	0.00	0.00	-	-
EU	0.16	0.39	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.25	-	-
India	-	-	0.07	0.16	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	1.66	2.51
Indonesia	-	-	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.33
Japan	0.12	0.14	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.06	-	-
Mexico	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.50
Norway	0.48	0.68	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.25	0.48	-	-
Russian Fed	0.09	0.27	0.06	0.06	0.15	0.24	0.00	0.00	-	-
USA	0.06	0.14	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.00	-	-

¹⁵ The shares of EU and USA (at 0.7% each) are also not insignificant, considering the size of the GDPs of these two large economies.

As a general rule, other things being equal, one would expect that a country where agriculture is an economically important sector, it would also claim a higher share of support from the government budget. However, other factors are also at play in the allocation of support to agriculture, such as a country's relative wealth and the competitiveness of the sectors. The importance of these factors are evident from comparing the ordering of countries in Figures 2.2.3 and 2.2.4. Norway stands out with the lowest contribution of agriculture in GDP (averaging 0.8%) but the support to the sector claims an average of 1% of GDP, among the highest between developed Members. Effectively, on average agriculture in Norway returns to the national economy 80% of what it receives from government budget. Clearly this reflects policy choices as regards the broader contribution of agriculture to national welfare beyond its economic and food security role. At the other end of the scale are Australia and Argentina for which support to agriculture as a share of their GDP is less than 1/5th of one percent (and the largest part of that Green as shown in Table 2.2.3), reflecting perhaps the comparative advantage of agriculture in these countries, performing well even without large support from national budgets.

Wide divergence in the per capita domestic support among Members

Yet another important statistic for comparing domestic support to agriculture between countries is expressing this support in per capita terms. This can be done in terms of the total population or, more pertinently, in terms of the rural population which is the main recipient of that support.

Four clusters of Members can be discerned from Figure 2.2.5, which shows average and maximum per capita domestic support for total and rural inhabitants, respectively, during the 2001-14 period. At the top of the ranking is Norway for which total domestic support averaged \$720/year for every inhabitant of the country during 2001-14. When expressed in terms of the rural population only, per capita total domestic support is about \$3400/year, climbing to nearly \$4000/year in some years. In the same cluster is Japan and USA, where per capita total domestic support for rural inhabitants is close to \$2000/year and well above that level in some years.

In the second cluster, also composed of developed Members (Canada, EU and Australia), per capita total domestic support per rural inhabitant averages between \$700-\$800/year and a maximum between \$800-\$1000/year. The third cluster consists of four Members (Russian Fed, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) with total domestic support per rural inhabitant of around \$200/year and maximum around \$300/year.

The last cluster consists of three countries with large populations overall and especially rural (China, India and Indonesia) where total domestic support per rural inhabitant is a fraction of that of other Members, averaging merely \$76, \$38 and \$18 per year, respectively, and about half of those amounts when expressed for all inhabitants of these countries. These numbers, on their own but also contrasted with those of other Members above, especially with those in the first cluster, give another perspective of the arguments advanced by these poorer countries in the negotiations. Central in these positions is greater flexibility in the rules to allow them to support their farmers while, at the same time, pushing for a reduction in the support provided by rich Members so as to narrow the competition gap due to government support.

Figure 2.2.5 Total domestic support per capita (2001-14)




Table 2.2.5 Total domestic support per capita (\$/inhabitant) (2001-14)

Member	All inhabitants		Rural inhabitants	
	Average	Max	Average	Max
Argentina	15	27	163	310
Australia	81	125	692	1053
Brazil	31	52	198	341
Canada	149	177	770	903
China	41	72	76	140
EU	204	237	758	881
India	26	43	39	64
Indonesia	9	22	18	45
Japan	207	281	1935	3480
Mexico	51	69	223	305
Norway	720	839	3359	3931
Russian Fed	44	48	235	263
USA	348	468	1766	2463

Evidence on the intensity and concentration of product-specific support

One of the recognized weaknesses of the rules on domestic support of the AoA is the nature of the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) being subject to an aggregate ceiling without commodity specific ceilings. This gives flexibility to Members

to shift support between commodities without violating WTO commitments, as long as the total current AMS remains within committed AMS limits.

In the context of addressing trade-distorting support in agriculture, several negotiating proposals to the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture (SSCoA) in recent years have highlighted the issue of intensity and concentration of support on particular products and the need to address this issue in the negotiations. This subsection discusses briefly this issue drawing heavily on a review of product-specific support based on recent notifications to WTO¹⁶. Product-specific support reported in Figure 2.2.6, expressed as a percentage of VoP of the respective products, provides the degree of intensity of such support during 2008-16 (or shorter periods for some Members that have not notified for recent years). The blue dots indicate averages over this period, the vertical bars indicate the range of variation of that support, and the red dotted line represents the *de minimis* limit applying to the respective WTO Member.

It is clear that there is a wide variation on the degree of product-specific support between Members and for the supported products within each Member. The analysis in the ICTSD paper indicates that in the case of the EU, product-specific support as a share of the value of production has declined dramatically over the last decade, as the bloc has moved away from “coupled” payments linked to the volume and type of production¹⁷. In 2008 EU’s product-specific support for sugar and tobacco represented over 90% and almost 70% of VoP, respectively. Reforms since then brought that

¹⁶ Hepburn, J., and C. Bellmann. 2018. *How Could Africa Be Affected by Product-specific Support for Farm Goods?* Policy Brief. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD).


¹⁷ Hepburn, op.cit.

support to below the 5% *de minimis* threshold for all products except wheat¹⁸.

In the case of the US, product-specific support for sugar, cotton and peanuts was consistently above 5% of VoP and up to 35% for cotton. Support for sugar, in contrast, has been consistently above 40% and up to 65% of VoP in certain years. Japan's product-specific support is concentrated on four main agricultural product groups, with sugar, beef and veal, and meat of swine

consistently between 20% and 60% of the value of production in the 2008-14 period. As in the case of the EU, Canada's product-specific support seems to represent a downward trend for the years notified, with many products now falling below the *de minimis* threshold. As for the developing countries included in Figure 2.2.6, it is evident that their product-specific support levels are well within their *de minimis* ceiling, although as already noted for some of them notifications are not up of date.

Figure 2.2.6 Product-Specific support in relation to VoP (%)



Source: Hepburn, J., and C. Bellmann, op.cit.


¹⁸ The fact that product specific support exceed *de minimis* levels does not imply violation of the WTO rules as the EU and other countries have in addition access to AMS

entitlements and so in those situations the support for those products in excess of *de minimis* the product-specific support falls under the aggregate AMS.

Turning to the concentration of product-specific support to a few products, the ICTSD paper uses as a measure the share of product-specific support in total non-Green support (Figure 2.2.7). While the picture provided is not complete, it does reveal a high concentration of product-specific support. For example, in the case of the EU, dairy averaged for 34% of all non-Green support and wheat 16%. For the US, again dairy commanded high shares of support (20% up to 2015), corn

(13% to 21%), wheat (5% to 12%) and cotton (3% and 9%). Dairy has also been a sector that commanded a high share of non-Green support in Canada, with the share of milk being around 20% and increasing in recent years. Similarly, in Japan, meat of swine, beef and veal has commanded between a third and a quarter of all non-Green support.

Figure 2.2.7 Product-Specific support in relation to total non-Green support (%)



Source: Hepburn, J., and C. Bellmann, op.cit.

SECTION 3

Domestic Support in Relation to Intended Commitments Under 2008 Rev 4 Draft Modalities¹⁹

3.1 Overview of architecture of AoA under Rev 4

It is recalled that under the existing AoA, reduction commitments applied only on the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). Members had committed to reduce their current AMS to the Final Bound Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (FBTAMS) and to maintain AMS below that ceiling thereafter. There were not reduction commitments for other trade-distorting components of domestic support, i.e. Blue box, *de minimis* (limited to 5% and 10% for developed and developing Members, respectively) as well as Art. 6.2 support provided by developing Members.

Definition of Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS)

Negotiations under the Doha Round aimed at establishing reduction commitments for all trade-distorting domestic support and established the

concept of Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS), being the sum of AMS, Product-Specific (PS) *de minimis*, Non-Product Specific (NPS) *de minimis* and Blue.

Disciplining OTDS and its components

A specific aim of the intended disciplines in Rev 4 on domestic support was to prevent shifting of support from one category to another as a means to circumvent reduction commitments. In order to address that problem the intention in Rev 4 was to discipline not only OTDS but also its components. This was done by establishing rules for reduction commitments applicable to each one of the four components of OTDS. Another aim of the intended disciplines was to reduce somewhat the large gap in domestic support between Members (discussed in previous chapter). To this effect, Rev 4 proposed a tiered reduction formula for both OTDS and AMS, whereby Members with high entitlements of domestic support would have undertaken higher cuts than Members with lower entitlements.


¹⁹ An important caveat must be pointed out with regard to the analysis that follows, on the way the Rev 4 draft modalities would have played in practice, had they been adopted in 2008. The draft modalities, not unlike many other negotiated texts in the WTO, contains many ambiguities and it leaves several choices that Members themselves would have made in their schedule of commitments, had these modalities been adopted. Hence, a definite interpretation of the draft legal details is not possible, nor is it possible to second-guess Members' choices in their schedule of commitments. Therefore, the analysis in this section does not claim to be exact, i.e. to show with precision what may have happened had Rev 4 been adopted but to give a first approximation of the numbers that would have resulted from the implementation of Rev 4.

As in the case of the existing AoA under the Uruguay Round, Green box policies were exempt from reduction commitments. Similarly, support under Art. 6.2 of the AoA for developing countries were not to be subject to reduction commitments. In broad terms, the envisaged disciplines on domestic support as codified in Rev. 4 are shown in Figure 3.1.1.

3.2 Base OTDS and reduction commitments

As in the case of Uruguay Round, the modalities under Rev 4 (paras 1 to 58) envisaged the establishment of base levels of support on which reduction commitments would have applied. They also envisaged a schedule of implementation of these commitments and provisions for special and differential treatment for developing Members.

Figure 3.1.1 Intended architecture of domestic support under Rev 4



Paras 1 and 2 of Rev 4 establish the parameters for calculating the Base level of Overall Trade-

Distorting Domestic Support (hereafter "Base OTDS"). One essential element in the calculation of the Base OTDS is the Value of Agricultural Production (VoP) in the 1995-2000 period (or the optional 1995-2004 for developing Members). For the purposes of this study, VoP data was obtained from FAOSTAT (Annex Table 2)²⁰. The other basic information necessary for calculating the Base OTDS is the Final Base Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (FBTAMS), i.e. Members' entitlements to AMS after completing the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments. On the basis of these data and the modalities specified in paras 1 and 2 of Rev. 4, the Base OTDS for the Members considered in the study are shown in the first column of Table 3.2.1.

OTDS reduction commitments from base levels were to be following a tiered formula, whereby Members with high OTDS levels would have made higher cuts. As it turns out from applying the modalities spelled out in paras 3 and 4 of Rev 4, reduction commitment would range from 80% and 36.6% (second column of Table 3.2.1), while there are zero cuts stipulated for developing country Members with no FBTAMS commitments, such as China, India and Indonesia among the countries considered in the study. Similarly, for Russian Fed., a recently acceding member (RAM) and not a member of WTO in 2008, it is assumed that, as a RAM, it would not have been required to make a reduction commitment, in line with what is stipulated in Rev 4 as regards other RAMs in 2008.

There are also specific provisions for the implementation and staging of reduction commitments, amounting to 6 steps over 5 years, and 9 steps over 8 years for developed and

²⁰ It may be noted that there are certain discrepancies in the VoP data reported to CoA by some Members and that

obtained from FAOSTAT. For the sake of consistency, the FAOSTAT data was used throughout.

developing Members, respectively, with frontloading reductions in the first day of the implementation period. The remaining columns of Table 3.2.1 provide the outcome of these

provisions on the reduction commitments of Base OTDS over the implementation period for the WTO Members considered in the analysis.

Table 3.2.1 OTDS intended reduction commitments (implementation starting in 2009)

	Base OTDS \$ million	OTDS cut %	Final OTDS \$ million	OTDS limits during implementation period (\$ million)								
				1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)	7th (2015)	8th (2016)	9th (2017)
Argentina	5438	36.6	3446	5040	4841	4641	4442	4243	4044	3845	3645	3446
Australia	3458	55.0	1556	2830	2575	2320	2066	1811	1556	1556	1556	1556
Brazil	14210	36.6	9005	13169	12648	12128	11607	11087	10566	10046	9525	9005
Canada	6707	55.0	3018	5489	4995	4501	4007	3512	3018	3018	3018	3018
China	68278	0.0	68278	68278	68278	68278	68278	68278	68278	68278	68278	68278
EU	133089	80.0	26618	97953	83686	69419	55152	40885	26618	26618	26618	26618
India	26717	0.0	26717	26717	26717	26717	26717	26717	26717	26717	26717	26717
Indonesia	7095	0.0	7095	7095	7095	7095	7095	7095	7095	7095	7095	7095
Japan	53744	75.0	13436	40442	35041	29640	24238	18837	13436	13436	13436	13436
Mexico	8889	36.6	5633	8237	7912	7586	7261	6935	6609	6284	5958	5633
Norway	2145	55.0	965	1756	1598	1439	1281	1123	965	965	965	965
Russian Fed	11834	0.0	11834	11834	11834	11834	11834	11834	11834	11834	11834	11834
USA	45569	70.0	13671	35043	30768	26494	22220	17945	13671	13671	13671	13671

Compliance with intended OTDS reduction commitments

Assuming 1 January 2009 as the first day of implementation of the 2008 Rev 4 commitments, it is possible to do an ex post assessment of whether the Members considered in this study would have been in compliance. Table 3.2.2 shows the result of this exercise, comparing actual OTDS levels for the period 2009 to 2014 with corresponding annual OTDS limits. All Members considered would have been within their OTDS commitments except of Norway, exceeding its ceiling OTDS by considerable amounts for all years of the implementation period. Also to be noted is that the USA comes close to breaching its OTDS commitment in the last year of the assumed implementation period. This is not due to increasing its current OTDS but to the reduced OTDS entitlement in line with its reduction commitment still in progress.

Table 3.2.2 Share of current OTDS to OTDS limits (%)

OTDS	1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)
Argentina	1.9	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.2	-
Australia	1.7	3.0	10.8	13.7	11.9	19.7
Brazil	18.0	27.5	30.0	22.5	21.9	25.3
Canada	48.1	60.4	68.9	74.6	75.8	64.4
China	23.3	26.6	-	-	-	-
EU	24.4	17.2	21.7	24.3	34.5	56.6
India	6.5	8.5	11.6	12.7	9.1	11.4
Indonesia	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-
Japan	20.1	31.7	38.5	50.9	52.2	63.4
Mexico	13.3	17.3	20.4	12.9	18.9	17.3
Norway	132.1	148.0	181.6	208.4	229.2	251.6
Russian Fed	-	-	-	58.3	58.2	42.3
USA	34.8	32.9	54.3	67.6	79.5	99.5

3.3 Reduction commitments of the components of OTDS

Compliance with intended AMS reduction commitments

The starting point for reduction of AMS under Rev 4 was the Final Base Total AMS (FBTAMS) levels resulting from the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments. As in the case of OTDS, a tiered formula for reduction commitments was

envisaged under Rev 4, stipulating higher cuts for Members with higher FBTAMS. In accordance with the tiered formula (spelled out in paras 13 and 14 of Rev 4), AMS cuts ranged from a maximum of 70% to a minimum of 45% (second column of Table 3.3.1). There were not reduction commitments for Members with zero FBTAMS (China, India and Indonesia) and for those with levels less than \$100 million (Argentina). Similarly, as in the case of OTDS, Russian Fed., as a recently acceding member (RAM), it would not have been required to make an AMS reduction commitment, in line with what is stipulated in Rev 4 as regards other RAMs in 2008.

Table 3.3.1 AMS intended reduction commitments (implementation starting in 2009)

	FBTAMS \$ million	AMS cut %	Final AMS \$ million	AMS limits during implementation period (\$ million)								
				1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)	7th (2015)	8th (2016)	9th (2017)
Argentina	75	0.0	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Australia	323	45.0	178	299	275	251	226	202	178	178	178	178
Brazil	902	45.0	496	857	812	766	721	676	631	586	541	496
Canada	3712	45.0	2041	3433	3155	2876	2598	2320	2041	2041	2041	2041
China	0	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EU	91328	70.0	27398	75345	65756	56167	46577	36988	27398	27398	27398	27398
India	0	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indonesia	0	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	39241	70.0	11772	32374	28254	24133	20013	15893	11772	11772	11772	11772
Mexico	2206	45.0	1213	2041	1937	1834	1730	1627	1524	1420	1317	1213
Norway	1791	52.5	851	1687	1519	1352	1185	1018	851	851	851	851
Russian Fed	6954	0.0	6954	6954	6954	6954	6954	6954	6954	6954	6954	6954
USA	19107	60.0	7643	16241	14521	12802	11082	9362	7643	7643	7643	7643

As in the case of OTDS, there are specific provisions for the implementation and staging of AMS reduction commitments, amounting to 6 and 9 steps for developed and developing Members, respectively, as well as frontloading of reductions in the first day of implementation. The remaining columns of Table 3.3.1 provide the outcome of these provisions on reduction commitments of FBTAMS over the implementation period for the WTO Members considered in the study.

Again, assuming 1 January 2009 as the first day of implementation of the 2008 Rev 4 commitments, it is possible to do an ex post assessment of whether the Members considered in the study would have been in compliance. Table 3.3.2 shows the result of this exercise, comparing actual AMS levels for the period 2009 to 2014 with corresponding annual AMS limits. Again, with the exception of Norway, all Members considered here would have been within their AMS commitments. Another Member that comes close to breaching its AMS commitment is Argentina, despite its low levels of overall trade-

distorting support as seen in the OTDS table above.

Table 3.3.2 Share of current AMS to AMS limits (%)

AMS	1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)
Argentina	98.2	98.2	98.2	95.6	98.2	-
Australia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Brazil	34.2	33.1	27.9	1.1	0.0	0.0
Canada	35.5	15.2	18.4	32.2	20.9	26.2
China	-	-	-	-	-	-
EU	20.1	13.1	17.0	16.3	21.4	32.2
India	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	18.6	23.3	29.0	38.1	38.3	48.2
Mexico	16.4	19.6	21.0	10.9	21.8	7.5
Norway	96.5	105.0	129.9	152.0	165.1	182.3
Russian Fed	-	-	-	83.4	0.9	0.8
USA	40.3	35.5	55.2	61.9	73.6	49.9

It should be noted that in addition to aggregate AMS commitments, Rev 4 modalities also stipulate the establishment of product-specific AMS limits (paras 21 to 29 of Rev 4). There are specific modalities as to how these limits are to be established based on the average of product-specific AMS during the Uruguay Round implementation period (1995-2000) as notified to the CoA, as well as additional specificity applicable to some Members. As these go beyond the scope of this study, they are not analysed here. However, considering the high intensity and concentration of trade-distorting support to a few products, as discussed in section 2.2.4 above, it may be conceivable that these product-specific AMS limits may be breached for some Members, despite aggregate AMS being generally well below bound levels.

Compliance with intended de minimis reduction commitments

Rev 4 modalities (paras 30 to 34) envisioned also a reduction of the existing limits of 5% for developed Members and 10% for developing exempted from AMS for both Product Specific (PS) and Non-Product Specific (NPS) *de minimis* support. The intended reduction was to be 50% (2/3 of that by developing Members) and to take

effect on the first day of the implementation period (three years for developing Members). Additional provisions applied for developing Members with zero FBTAMS, for which there would be no reduction of *de minimis* levels (China, India and Indonesia in our study countries). Similarly, no reduction was intended for RAMs (Russian Fed. falls in that category). Given these modalities, the intended reductions of PS and NPS *de minimis* levels are shown in the second column of Table 3.3.3. Assuming, as before, 1 January 2009 as the first day of implementation of the 2008 Rev 4 commitments, the remaining columns of Table 3.3.3 shows the *de minimis* limits applicable to both PS and NPS support.

Compliance of actual *de minimis* support levels with the intended PS and NPS *de minimis* limits is shown in Tables 3.3.4 and 3.3.5, respectively. The Tables compare actual *de minimis* support levels for 2009 to 2014 with corresponding intended *de minimis* limits. It is clear that most Members are well below their entitled PS *de minimis* levels. However, as regards NPS *de minimis* support, several Members would be breaching their commitments or would be close doing so (Table 3.3.5). These include Canada, Japan and Russian Federation.

Table 3.3.3 de minimis intended reduction commitments (implementation starting in 2009)

	de minimis %	de minimis cut %	Final de minimis %	PS and NPS de minimis limits during implementation period (% of VoP)								
				1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)	7th (2015)	8th (2016)	9th (2017)
Argentina	10.0	33.3	6.7	8.9	7.8	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7
Australia	5.0	50.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Brazil	10.0	33.3	6.7	8.9	7.8	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7
Canada	5.0	50.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
China	8.5	0.0	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5
EU	5.0	50.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
India	10.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
Indonesia	10.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
Japan	5.0	50.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Mexico	10.0	33.3	6.7	8.9	7.8	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7
Norway	5.0	50.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Russian Fed	5.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
USA	5.0	50.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5

Table 3.3.4 Share of current PS de minimis to entitled limits (%)

de min PS	1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)
Argentina	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.5	-
Australia	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Brazil	1.4	5.2	4.0	1.7	2.2	2.7
Canada	6.0	38.3	30.1	10.7	17.8	12.8
China	4.3	4.9	-	-	-	-
EU	6.4	6.9	3.8	11.8	12.2	10.3
India	7.1	6.9	7.4	8.2	6.2	7.6
Indonesia	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-
Japan	6.3	11.6	7.4	9.7	9.6	8.1
Mexico	21.5	27.5	31.2	20.2	20.3	22.8
Norway	13.8	19.4	33.7	29.9	32.9	38.2
Russian Fed	-	-	-	24.4	27.7	22.4
USA	66.6	51.2	62.5	84.8	76.6	44.0

Table 3.3.5 Share of current NPS de minimis to entitled limits (%)

de min NPS	1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)
Argentina	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Australia	6.1	8.9	19.4	21.1	17.8	27.4
Brazil	16.1	19.4	19.5	16.9	14.2	15.2
Canada	153.2	228.9	188.9	164.6	141.8	113.0
China	19.6	19.0	-	-	-	-
EU	8.9	9.4	8.5	9.5	10.9	11.4
India	0.0	0.0	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.0
Indonesia	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-
Japan	73.6	29.3	85.3	88.1	82.8	91.0
Mexico	1.5	1.8	5.1	2.4	6.8	5.7
Norway	26.5	25.8	26.8	22.2	27.3	23.3
Russian Fed	-	-	-	0.0	110.1	81.1
USA	18.9	11.1	20.1	3.3	2.9	57.2

Compliance with intended Blue box reduction commitments

The reduction commitments of Blue box support envisioned in Rev 4 (paras 35 to 52) comprise a rather complex set of modalities for setting the base levels of Blue box support and the intended reduction commitments, as well as product-specific limits for this type of support. There is no intention to attempt disentangling these provisions in this general study (and it is questionable whether that is possible without specific information and interpretation of data by individual Members). It may be noted also that

this type of domestic support has been much on the decline in recent years and only a handful of Members continue to support farmers through this channel.

An approximation in interpreting the Rev 4 modalities on Blue box, is to take the general prescription in these modalities, referred to as the 'overall Blue box limit', representing the maximum value of support that can be provided under Blue box (always in compliance with the relevant Article 6.5 criteria for such support). It is stipulated that this maximum value shall not exceed 2.5% of the average total value of agricultural production in the 1995-2000 period,

in effect representing a reduction of 50% of the level of Blue box support included in the calculation of the Base OTDS (5% of VoP of the same period). A departure from that general approach concerns Norway for which Blue box support has been more than 40% of total trade distorting support. In such cases, as stipulated in Rev 4 modalities, the limit for that Member shall, instead, be established by application of a percentage reduction on the average 1995-2000 base period amount. That percentage reduction shall equal the percentage reduction that the Member concerned is to make in its Final Bound Total AMS.

The resulting numbers of intended Blue box reduction commitments are shown in Table 3.4.6, assuming an implementation period of no more than 2 years, starting on 1 January 2009. These annual Blue box limits are then compared with actual levels of Blue box support during the 2009 to 2014 period to check compliance (Table 3.3.7). As already stated, only a handful of Members continue to provide Blue box support (EU, Japan and Norway). Of those that still do, only Norway would have breached the Rev 4 intended Blue box reduction commitments.

Table 3.3.6 Blue box intended reduction commitments (implementation starting in 2009)

	Blue box \$ million	Blue box cut %	Final Blue box \$ million	Blue box limits during implementation period (\$ million)								
				1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)	7th (2015)	8th (2016)	9th (2017)
Argentina	1073	50	536	536	536	536	536	536	536	536	536	536
Australia	1045	50	522	522	522	522	522	522	522	522	522	522
Brazil	2662	50	1331	1331	1331	1331	1331	1331	1331	1331	1331	1331
Canada	998	50	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499
China	15518	50	7759	7759	7759	7759	7759	7759	7759	7759	7759	7759
EU	13920	50	6960	6960	6960	6960	6960	6960	6960	6960	6960	6960
India	5343	50	2672	2672	2672	2672	2672	2672	2672	2672	2672	2672
Indonesia	1419	50	710	710	710	710	710	710	710	710	710	710
Japan	4834	50	2417	2417	2417	2417	2417	2417	2417	2417	2417	2417
Mexico	1336	50	668	668	668	668	668	668	668	668	668	668
Norway	1000	50	500	750	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500
Russian Fed	1627	0	1627	813	813	813	813	813	813	813	813	813
USA	8821	50	4410	4410	4410	4410	4410	4410	4410	4410	4410	4410

Table 3.3.7 Share of current Blue to entitlement limits (%)

Blue	1st (2009)	2nd (2010)	3rd (2011)	4th (2012)	5th (2013)	6th (2014)
Argentina	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Australia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Brazil	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Canada	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
China	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-
EU	106.2	59.8	59.5	50.8	50.8	54.9
India	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Indonesia	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-
Japan	9.6	144.6	79.5	80.5	66.1	29.2
Mexico	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Norway	87.7	145.4	159.4	163.0	166.0	162.2
Russian Fed	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0
USA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Concluding Remarks

The multilateral negotiations under the WTO have been the dominant force shaping the policy environment in food and agriculture during the past three decades. Agricultural commodities are now under the multilateral trading system governing trade in goods and services, albeit the process of integration of agriculture in that system is not yet complete. By and large, the AoA rules have been helpful in disciplining measures responsible for structural surpluses and depressed prices in world markets but these rules are still not fully effective in preventing domestic support policies from distorting world markets and protecting the weaker participants in the system.

The shortcomings of the AoA were fully recognized from the time the AoA was signed in 1994 and the WTO membership responded to the in-built commitment for the continuation of the reform process by negotiating new rules for agriculture, along with those for other sectors, under the Doha Round.

The Doha negotiations reached an impasse in 2008, however they left behind a comprehensive package of negotiated texts, reflecting the state of play in the negotiations at that point in time. The intended disciplines on domestic support in agriculture contained in Rev 4, represent a welcome departure from the existing AoA and in many ways respond to the recognized deficiencies of existing rules on domestic support. Rev 4, albeit its complexity, has gone some way in filling the holes of existing rules so that Members would not have been able to circumvent the intension of the reform process, thus limiting the chances of domestic support policies distorting agricultural trade. With very few exceptions, the exercise carried out in this study demonstrated that the intended rules would have generally been useful in this respect.

This overall conclusion was to be expected. As was the case for the Uruguay Round, the main effort by Members in the Doha Round negotiations was to consolidate the status quo in on-going domestic reforms rather than undertaking commitments that would require them to make substantial new efforts.

Another important objective reflected in the domestic support rules in Rev 4 is the intension to foster more balance in the rights and obligations of the highly diverse WTO membership. There is a genuine effort in the proposed rules towards leveling the playing field in domestic support, by curtailing somewhat the access to distorting policies enjoyed by some rich Members in the past. However, at the same time, remaining flexibilities for unchecked levels in some categories of domestic support (including Art. 6.2 for developing Members) raise the question as to whether the leveling of the playing field would have been long lived.

All in all, had Rev 4 been adopted, while it would have improved the multilateral environment on domestic support rules in the short term, there are doubts on what would have been the situation over the longer term. The odds are against smooth trade relations in situations of unchecked and unpredictable trade policies and this has been amply demonstrated during the recent period of volatility in world food markets, when ad hoc non-disciplined border measures by both exporting and importing countries aggravated the effects of manageable market variability. More certainty and predictability in multilateral trade rules, at the border and domestically, enhances the credibility of the multilateral trade system and ultimately fosters an environment conducive to more trade openness and potential benefits for all participants.

Accordingly, striving to establish fair and balanced rules, including in the area of domestic support for agriculture, should be the objective of WTO Members as they prepare for the next WTO Ministerial Conference scheduled in the summer of 2020. The past, as this study brings out, can hold important lessons.

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Annex Table 1. Domestic support of selected WTO Members (2001-14) (\$ mn.)

Member	Argentina	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	AMS	48	63	76	74	75	75	75	74	74	74	74	72	74	-
Argentina	de min PS	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5	7	22	35	41	32	19
Argentina	de min NPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Argentina	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Argentina	Art. 6.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Argentina	Green	74	120	135	170	249	339	432	535	831	998	953	1005	848	-
Argentina	Total	122	183	211	244	324	418	512	616	927	1107	1068	1109	941	-
Argentina	non-Green	48	63	76	74	75	79	80	81	96	109	115	104	93	-
Argentina	OTDS	48	63	76	74	75	79	80	81	96	109	115	104	93	-
Member	Australia	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Australia	AMS	160	116	135	152	158	156	173	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia	de min PS	6	10	2	9	10	3	3	1	0	0	13	1	1	0
Australia	de min NPS	0	1	0	0	1	0	121	135	47	77	238	283	214	307
Australia	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia	Art. 6.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia	Green	728	1056	1291	1342	1595	1769	2320	1939	1742	1703	1862	1533	1397	1377
Australia	Total	894	1183	1428	1503	1764	1928	2617	2075	1789	1780	2113	1817	1612	1684
Australia	non-Green	166	127	137	161	169	159	297	136	47	77	251	284	215	307
Australia	OTDS	166	127	137	161	169	159	297	136	47	77	251	284	215	307
Member	Brazil	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Brazil	AMS	0	0	0	0	117	0	342	520	293	269	214	8	0	0
Brazil	de min PS	236	212	250	279	69	308	436	90	170	682	582	237	321	400
Brazil	de min NPS	740	803	1069	850	1193	1343	1470	2127	1908	2529	2846	2364	2109	2269
Brazil	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	Art. 6.2	332	393	495	394	626	765	643	900	871	1651	1739	1040	1070	1875
Brazil	Green	1462	893	820	896	1920	2422	2346	3297	3580	4907	4945	4771	6199	4295
Brazil	Total	2770	2301	2634	2419	3925	4838	5237	6934	6822	10038	10326	8420	9699	8839
Brazil	non-Green	1308	1408	1814	1523	2005	2416	2891	3637	3242	5131	5381	3649	3500	4544
Brazil	OTDS	976	1015	1319	1129	1379	1651	2248	2737	2371	3480	3642	2609	2430	2669
Member	Canada	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Canada	AMS	1838	2198	1260	1044	655	526	787	1578	1220	478	528	837	485	534
Canada	de min PS	152	242	75	136	287	301	323	87	53	364	354	131	243	144
Canada	de min NPS	0	0	809	1269	1215	1135	1766	1566	1365	2176	2218	2021	1934	1267
Canada	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	Art. 6.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	Green	1108	1088	2428	3152	3162	2705	2964	2436	2351	2771	2756	2656	2318	1974
Canada	Total	3098	3528	4572	5601	5319	4667	5840	5667	4989	5789	5856	5645	4980	3919
Canada	non-Green	1990	2440	2144	2449	2157	1962	2876	3231	2638	3018	3100	2989	2662	1945
Canada	OTDS	1990	2440	2144	2449	2157	1962	2876	3231	2638	3018	3100	2989	2662	1945
Member	China	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
China	AMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
China	de min PS	216	154	159	507	300	171	1509	2413	2850	3744	-	-	-	-
China	de min NPS	91	28	155	238	268	1875	4043	11349	13046	14426	-	-	-	-
China	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
China	Art. 6.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
China	Green	29278	30460	31166	37272	37778	44714	60185	85342	69892	78968	-	-	-	-
China	Total	29585	30642	31480	38017	38346	46760	65737	99104	85788	97138	-	-	-	-
China	non-Green	307	182	314	745	568	2046	5552	13762	15896	18170	-	-	-	-
China	OTDS	307	182	314	745	568	2046	5552	13762	15896	18170	-	-	-	-
Member	EU	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
EU	AMS	35249	26914	34864	38758	35352	33410	16909	17278	15119	8611	9535	7580	7929	8813
EU	de min PS	232	945	1017	1186	238	559	2104	482	597	682	434	1267	1401	1151
EU	de min NPS	514	882	1188	1349	1318	1765	1166	1109	831	928	960	1021	1256	1281
EU	Blue	21231	23271	27969	33819	16720	7146	7071	7834	7395	4161	4144	3539	3537	3819
EU	Art. 6.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EU	Green	18489	19203	24913	30287	50092	70916	85693	92028	88627	90129	98667	91405	86335	86579
EU	Total	75715	71215	89951	105399	103720	113796	112943	118731	112569	104511	113740	104812	100458	101643
EU	non-Green	57226	52012	65038	75112	53628	42880	27250	26703	23942	14382	15073	13407	14123	15064
EU	OTDS	57226	52012	65038	75112	53628	42880	27250	26703	23942	14382	15073	13407	14123	15064
Member	India	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
India	AMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	de min PS	0	0	0	1	2	0	433	1301	1730	2282	2765	2973	2050	2678
India	de min NPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	332	422	379	366
India	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	Art. 6.2	8254	7341	9026	10689	12316	15536	22312	31459	29857	31610	25405	24173	22828	24836
India	Green	4002	5237	5883	6183	5907	6493	9567	16927	17381	19479	18695	18741	18362	-
India	Total	12256	12578	14909	16873	18225	22029	32312	49687	48968	53371	47197	46309	43619	27880
India	non-Green	8254	7341	9026	10690	12318	15536	22745	32760	31587	33892	28502	27568	25257	27880
India	OTDS	0	0	0	1	2	0	433	1301	1730	2282	3097	3395	2429	3044

Annex Table 1. Domestic support of selected WTO Members (2001-14) (cont.)

Member	Indonesia	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Indonesia	AMS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
Indonesia	de min PS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
Indonesia	de min NPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
Indonesia	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
Indonesia	Art. 6.2	0	0	93	140	276	360	737	1667	1918	2265	1874	-	-	-
Indonesia	Green	241	509	566	1408	799	857	1026	1489	1625	2321	3563	-	-	-
Indonesia	Total	241	509	659	1548	1075	1217	1763	3156	3543	4586	5437	-	-	-
Indonesia	non-Green	0	0	93	140	276	360	737	1667	1918	2265	1874	-	-	-
Indonesia	OTDS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
Member	Japan	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Japan	AMS	5486	5822	5536	5618	5383	4911	3540	5035	6036	6572	7006	7631	6079	5669
Japan	de min PS	99	185	146	224	210	161	189	149	145	296	199	274	224	175
Japan	de min NPS	165	163	156	157	165	163	701	1332	1705	749	2288	2483	1936	1963
Japan	Blue	750	690	588	627	592	603	360	313	233	3495	1921	1945	1597	705
Japan	Art. 6.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	Green	20957	18145	17996	19356	17386	15498	15984	17776	19754	17349	24745	23523	17035	15133
Japan	Total	27457	25005	24422	25982	23736	21336	20774	24605	27873	28461	36159	35856	26871	23645
Japan	non-Green	6500	6860	6426	6626	6350	5838	4790	6829	8119	11112	11414	12333	9836	8512
Japan	OTDS	6500	6860	6426	6626	6350	5838	4790	6829	8119	11112	11414	12333	9836	8512
Member	Mexico	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Mexico	AMS	520	342	301	232	458	151	324	328	334	379	386	188	354	115
Mexico	de min PS	302	340	392	436	302	676	699	1026	708	928	997	671	716	822
Mexico	de min NPS	1	11	13	18	7	12	13	39	50	60	164	81	239	207
Mexico	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	Art. 6.2	394	3865	627	606	723	843	751	1131	926	1225	1189	1118	1027	1076
Mexico	Green	2563	2632	2724	2932	3105	3112	3777	3355	3362	3667	4991	4796	5081	5721
Mexico	Total	3780	7190	4057	4224	4595	4794	5564	5879	5380	6259	7727	6854	7417	7941
Mexico	non-Green	1217	4558	1333	1292	1490	1682	1787	2524	2018	2592	2736	2058	2336	2220
Mexico	OTDS	823	693	706	686	767	839	1036	1393	1092	1367	1547	940	1309	1144
Member	Norway	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Norway	AMS	1190	1303	1530	1582	1696	1679	1781	2049	1627	1596	1756	1801	1681	1551
Norway	de min PS	0	10	5	17	10	8	11	11	12	18	34	31	35	41
Norway	de min NPS	0	0	0	0	24	19	19	22	23	24	27	23	29	25
Norway	Blue	815	943	1040	1103	608	592	635	706	658	727	797	815	830	811
Norway	Art. 6.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	Green	480	543	548	591	910	965	1146	1217	1128	1197	1310	1324	1334	1251
Norway	Total	2485	2799	3123	3293	3248	3263	3592	4005	3448	3562	3924	3994	3909	3679
Norway	non-Green	2005	2256	2575	2702	2338	2298	2446	2788	2320	2365	2614	2670	2575	2428
Norway	OTDS	2005	2256	2575	2702	2338	2298	2446	2788	2320	2365	2614	2670	2575	2428
Member	Russian Fed.	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Russian Fed	AMS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5800	65	53
Russian Fed	de min PS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1102	1372	1074
Russian Fed	de min NPS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	5455	3881
Russian Fed	Blue	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Russian Fed	Art. 6.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Russian Fed	Green	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1730	2923	2884
Russian Fed	Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8632	9815	7892
Russian Fed	non-Green	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6902	6892	5008
Russian Fed	OTDS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6902	6892	5008
Member	USA	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
USA	AMS	14482	9637	6950	11629	12943	7742	6260	9183	6548	5161	7067	6860	6892	3810
USA	de min PS	224	1590	436	680	118	171	237	2874	4405	4069	5549	7846	7103	4256
USA	de min NPS	6828	5100	2801	5778	5862	3430	2023	3579	1249	883	1782	310	273	5532
USA	Blue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA	Art. 6.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA	Green	50672	58322	64062	67425	72328	76035	76162	86218	100779	118957	125116	127441	133311	124483
USA	Total	72206	74649	74249	85512	91251	87378	84682	101854	112981	129070	139514	142457	147579	138081
USA	non-Green	21534	16327	10187	18087	18923	11343	8520	15636	12202	10113	14398	15016	14268	13598
USA	OTDS	21534	16327	10187	18087	18923	11343	8520	15636	12202	10113	14398	15016	14268	13598

Annex Table 2. Value of Agricultural Production (VoP) (\$ million)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	20812	21744	22910	22901	19657	20683	20182	16826	21524	22102	24186	24364	32605	38621	27282	40781	50784	49353	52144	51353
Australia	20453	23844	21993	19908	20805	18367	18748	22047	20662	26366	27582	27968	28027	32466	30973	34622	49129	53556	48165	44761
Brazil	58598	55461	57887	57706	42806	46933	41372	40123	51938	61763	70796	79361	111723	146788	133656	167390	219252	209957	223541	223487
Canada	19131	22091	20699	19254	19304	19325	19357	19215	21916	24664	25796	27442	33038	43179	35629	38019	46973	49104	54563	44868
China	261431	339316	298395	299654	273924	297255	274641	288327	344311	426297	463494	518403	620105	774728	781103	894077	1161019	1240280	1297413	1194652
EU	307572	314631	282881	273679	255341	236334	239311	241741	290299	331005	319576	337161	404943	458506	375545	394784	453838	430379	459712	448883
India	100911	104781	104629	99375	106095	101777	102235	97392	117230	134247	152649	174742	246770	250957	245274	330946	373769	361765	328977	351941
Indonesia	36452	38902	32743	14027	23787	21621	20527	26504	31927	37325	40213	50270	59389	72908	72941	99257	146942	154143	139349	135108
Japan	125770	104708	89411	81463	89742	89007	76109	71714	79231	88264	86036	78877	76678	87764	92713	102130	107260	112748	93565	86291
Mexico	19464	22999	25368	25777	26350	27681	30213	28983	29103	31357	32986	36280	40037	43905	37065	43401	47879	49723	52838	54085
Norway	2720	2713	2396	2313	2147	1864	1842	2125	2483	2678	2770	2838	3337	3832	3475	3716	4036	4153	4255	4294
Russian Fed	43236	41168	39975	25675	21730	23403	28098	27036	30913	39012	42916	49923	65508	88958	69110	69680	96836	90465	99049	95682
USA	169688	197165	179706	172422	168878	170634	176667	171849	195251	214431	211875	221035	284006	291294	264734	317788	355106	370240	370894	386808

Annex Table 3. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (\$ billion)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	280	295	318	324	307	308	291	111	140	166	201	234	290	366	336	426	530	581	613	567
Australia	393	436	437	390	427	409	390	436	559	679	762	819	986	1056	1012	1294	1539	1582	1535	1458
Brazil	778	850	882	854	594	652	561	512	559	669	892	1108	1397	1696	1667	2209	2616	2465	2473	2456
Canada	604	629	653	632	676	742	736	758	892	1023	1169	1315	1465	1549	1371	1613	1789	1824	1843	1793
China	737	867	965	1033	1097	1215	1344	1478	1671	1966	2309	2774	3571	4604	5122	6066	7522	8570	9635	10535
EU	9621	9836	9283	9598	9587	8905	9000	9812	11944	13793	14427	15391	17785	19133	17100	16993	18353	17290	18027	18633
India	358	377	410	412	440	454	468	490	573	694	812	919	1169	1255	1298	1651	1872	1861	1917	2039
Indonesia	236	266	252	112	164	176	171	208	250	273	304	388	460	543	575	755	893	918	913	891
Japan	5449	4834	4415	4033	4562	4888	4304	4115	4446	4815	4755	4530	4515	5038	5231	5700	6157	6203	5156	4849
Mexico	360	411	500	526	600	708	757	772	729	782	877	975	1053	1110	900	1058	1180	1201	1274	1314
Norway	152	164	161	154	162	171	174	195	229	264	309	345	401	463	387	429	499	510	524	499
Russian Fed	399	392	405	271	196	260	307	345	430	591	764	990	1300	1661	1223	1525	2032	2170	2231	2004
USA	7664	8100	8609	9089	9661	10285	10622	10978	11511	12275	13094	13856	14478	14719	14419	14964	15518	16155	16692	17428

Annex Table 4. VoP as a share of GDP (%)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	7.4	7.4	7.2	7.1	6.4	6.7	6.9	15.2	15.3	13.3	12.1	10.4	11.3	10.6	8.1	9.6	9.6	8.5	8.5	9.1
Australia	5.2	5.5	5.0	5.1	4.9	4.5	4.8	5.1	3.7	3.9	3.6	3.4	2.8	3.1	3.1	2.7	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.1
Brazil	7.5	6.5	6.6	6.8	7.2	7.2	7.4	7.8	9.3	9.2	7.9	7.2	8.0	8.7	8.0	7.6	8.4	8.5	9.0	9.1
Canada	3.2	3.5	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.5
China	35.5	39.1	30.9	29.0	25.0	24.5	20.4	19.5	20.6	21.7	20.1	18.7	17.4	16.8	15.3	14.7	15.4	14.5	13.5	11.3
EU	3.2	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.4
India	28.2	27.8	25.5	24.1	24.1	22.4	21.8	19.9	20.4	19.4	18.8	19.0	21.1	20.0	18.9	20.0	20.0	19.4	17.2	17.3
Indonesia	15.4	14.6	13.0	12.6	14.5	12.3	12.0	12.7	12.8	13.6	13.2	13.0	12.9	13.4	12.7	13.1	16.5	16.8	15.3	15.2
Japan	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8
Mexico	5.4	5.6	5.1	4.9	4.4	3.9	4.0	3.8	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1
Norway	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9
Russian Fed	10.8	10.5	9.9	9.5	11.1	9.0	9.2	7.8	7.2	6.6	5.6	5.0	5.0	5.4	5.7	4.6	4.8	4.2	4.4	4.8
USA	2.2	2.4	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2

Annex Table 5. Shares of domestic support in relation to VoP (%)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.7	1.6	1.6	3.4	2.7	2.1	2.2	1.8	-
Australia	4.8	5.4	6.9	5.7	6.4	6.9	9.3	6.4	5.8	5.1	4.3	3.4	3.3	3.8
Brazil	6.7	5.7	5.1	3.9	5.5	6.1	4.7	4.7	5.1	6.0	4.7	4.0	4.3	4.0
Canada	16.0	18.4	20.9	22.7	20.6	17.0	17.7	13.1	14.0	15.2	12.5	11.5	9.1	8.7
China	10.8	10.6	9.1	8.9	8.3	9.0	10.6	12.8	11.0	10.9	-	-	-	-
EU	31.6	29.5	31.0	31.8	32.5	33.8	27.9	25.9	30.0	26.5	25.1	24.4	21.9	22.6
India	12.0	12.9	12.7	12.6	11.9	12.6	13.1	19.8	20.0	16.1	12.6	12.8	13.3	7.9
Indonesia	1.2	1.9	2.1	4.1	2.7	2.4	3.0	4.3	4.9	4.6	3.7	-	-	-
Japan	36.1	34.9	30.8	29.4	27.6	27.0	27.1	28.0	30.1	27.9	33.7	31.8	28.7	27.4
Mexico	12.5	24.8	13.9	13.5	13.9	13.2	13.9	13.4	14.5	14.4	16.1	13.8	14.0	14.7
Norway	134.9	131.7	125.8	123.0	117.3	115.0	107.6	104.5	99.2	95.9	97.2	96.2	91.9	85.7
Russian Fed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.5	9.9	8.2
USA	40.9	43.4	38.0	39.9	43.1	39.5	29.8	35.0	42.7	40.6	39.3	38.5	39.8	35.7

Annex Table 6. Shares of domestic support in relation to GDP (%)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	0.04	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.28	0.26	0.20	0.19	0.15	-
Australia	0.23	0.27	0.26	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.27	0.20	0.18	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.12
Brazil	0.49	0.45	0.47	0.36	0.44	0.44	0.37	0.41	0.41	0.45	0.39	0.34	0.39	0.36
Canada	0.42	0.47	0.51	0.55	0.45	0.35	0.40	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.33	0.31	0.27	0.22
China	2.20	2.07	1.88	1.93	1.66	1.69	1.84	2.15	1.67	1.60	-	-	-	-
EU	0.84	0.73	0.75	0.76	0.72	0.74	0.64	0.62	0.66	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.56	0.55
India	2.62	2.57	2.60	2.43	2.24	2.40	2.76	3.96	3.77	3.23	2.52	2.49	2.28	1.37
Indonesia	0.14	0.24	0.26	0.57	0.35	0.31	0.38	0.58	0.62	0.61	0.61	-	-	-
Japan	0.64	0.61	0.55	0.54	0.50	0.47	0.46	0.49	0.53	0.50	0.59	0.58	0.52	0.49
Mexico	0.50	0.93	0.56	0.54	0.52	0.49	0.53	0.53	0.60	0.59	0.65	0.57	0.58	0.60
Norway	1.43	1.43	1.37	1.25	1.05	0.94	0.90	0.87	0.89	0.83	0.79	0.78	0.75	0.74
Russian Fed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.40	0.44	0.39
USA	0.68	0.68	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.63	0.58	0.69	0.78	0.86	0.90	0.88	0.88	0.79

Annex Table 7. Domestic support per capita (US\$/capita/year)

All inhabitants	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	3	5	6	6	8	11	13	15	23	27	26	26	22	-
Australia	46	61	72	75	87	94	125	97	82	80	94	80	70	72
Brazil	16	13	14	13	21	26	27	36	35	51	52	42	48	43
Canada	100	113	145	175	165	143	177	170	148	169	170	162	141	110
China	22	23	24	28	28	34	48	72	62	70	-	-	-	-
EU	155	145	183	214	209	229	226	237	224	207	225	207	198	201
India	11	12	13	15	16	19	27	42	40	43	38	37	34	22
Indonesia	1	2	3	7	5	5	8	13	15	19	22	-	-	-
Japan	215	196	191	203	185	166	162	191	217	221	281	279	209	184
Mexico	37	69	38	39	42	44	50	52	47	53	65	57	61	64
Norway	549	616	683	716	701	698	761	839	714	729	793	797	770	716
Russian Fed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48	48	35
USA	253	260	256	292	309	293	282	336	369	418	449	455	468	435

Rural inhabitants	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	31	46	54	63	85	110	136	166	252	303	296	310	266	-
Australia	363	482	582	612	716	780	1053	830	711	705	835	718	637	665
Brazil	85	71	81	75	123	153	167	222	221	328	341	281	326	300
Canada	495	561	722	879	830	723	903	874	768	890	899	866	764	601
China	36	38	40	49	50	62	89	137	121	140	-	-	-	-
EU	547	516	654	769	759	836	834	881	839	783	857	794	766	780
India	16	16	19	21	23	27	40	61	59	64	56	55	51	33
Indonesia	2	4	5	13	9	10	15	26	29	38	45	-	-	-
Japan	1089	1079	1149	1334	1333	1297	1362	1742	2134	2358	3245	3480	2815	2668
Mexico	144	273	154	161	175	183	212	225	206	239	296	263	285	305
Norway	2349	2684	3009	3157	3120	3162	3494	3904	3367	3485	3851	3931	3863	3650
Russian Fed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	230	263	212
USA	1209	1249	1242	1430	1525	1459	1413	1698	1882	2150	2324	2375	2463	2307

Annex Table 8. Total and Rural Population (1000)

Annex Table 8a. Total Population of Selected WTO Members (1000)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	37472	37889	38309	38729	39145	39559	39970	40382	40799	41224	41657	42097	42540	42982
Australia	19269	19475	19697	19948	20239	20574	20947	21342	21739	22120	22480	22822	23151	23475
Brazil	177751	180151	182482	184738	186917	189012	191027	192979	194896	196796	198687	200561	202409	204213
Canada	31025	31321	31628	31949	32288	32645	33020	33405	33790	34169	34539	34901	35255	35605
China	1320083	1327998	1335893	1343744	1351537	1359288	1367036	1374798	1382594	1390420	1398281	1406131	1413857	1421307
EU	488603	490118	491827	493631	495449	497281	499123	500892	502486	503836	504895	505687	506302	506872
India	1071478	1089807	1108028	1126136	1144119	1161978	1179681	1197147	1214270	1230981	1247236	1263066	1278562	1293859
Indonesia	214507	217508	220545	223615	226713	229838	232989	236159	239340	242524	245708	248883	252032	255131
Japan	127724	127903	128068	128214	128336	128433	128505	128551	128567	128552	128505	128426	128313	128163
Mexico	103067	104356	105640	106996	108472	110092	111836	113662	115505	117319	119090	120828	122536	124222
Norway	4523	4546	4570	4598	4632	4673	4720	4771	4827	4886	4948	5012	5077	5140
Russian Fed	145815	145195	144585	144045	143618	143323	143150	143083	143093	143154	143264	143421	143597	143761
USA	284852	287507	290028	292539	295130	297827	300595	303374	306076	308641	311051	313335	315537	317719

Annex Table 8b. Rural Population of Selected WTO Members (1000)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Argentina	3978	3944	3907	3870	3832	3795	3758	3721	3684	3648	3611	3576	3543	3510
Australia	2460	2456	2455	2457	2463	2473	2486	2501	2515	2524	2530	2532	2532	2531
Brazil	32645	32506	32347	32163	31953	31713	31448	31165	30873	30579	30284	29994	29711	29429
Canada	6256	6292	6329	6369	6411	6453	6466	6481	6495	6505	6513	6517	6519	6519
China	816748	804094	791046	777629	763957	750612	737365	723882	710221	696294	682144	668196	654478	640927
EU	138459	137963	137511	137072	136602	136049	135434	134802	134143	133471	132766	132016	131223	130395
India	763706	772601	781270	789626	797627	805226	812452	819375	826114	832723	839231	845516	851534	857198
Indonesia	121286	121355	121390	121391	121362	121298	121196	121041	120823	120522	120166	119759	119306	118813
Japan	25207	23170	21261	19472	17805	16455	15253	14122	13063	12070	11143	10304	9547	8864
Mexico	26288	26292	26277	26255	26234	26216	26199	26181	26163	26141	26118	26094	26067	26034
Norway	1058	1043	1038	1043	1041	1032	1028	1026	1024	1022	1019	1016	1012	1008
Russian Fed	38961	38794	38577	38366	38196	38073	37992	37934	37873	37790	37679	37530	37350	37149
USA	59710	59770	59797	59817	59847	59889	59939	59987	60023	60038	60023	59982	59922	59849

